Flow sharing and bankruptcy games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO
009380, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
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