For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, a rule is consistent if the choice it makes for each problem is always in agreement with the choice it makes for each "reduced problem" obtained by imagining that some claimants leave with their awards and reassessing the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining claimants. We develop a general technique to determine whether a given two-claimant rule admits a consistent extension to general populations, and to identify this extension if it exists. We apply the technique to a succession of examples. One application is to a one-parameter family of rules that offer a compromise between the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules. We show that a consistent extension of such a rule exists only if all the weight is placed on the former or all the weight is placed on the latter. Another application is to a family of rules that provide a compromise between the constrained equal awards and proportional rules, and a dual family that provide a compromise between the constrained equal losses and proportional rules. In each case, we identify the restrictions implied by consistency.
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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number
528.
Length: 37 pages Date of creation: Apr 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:528
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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