The Rights-Egalitarian Solution for NTU Sharing Problems
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution” that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005) for the case of rationing problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 09.01.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Sharing problems; rights egalitarian solution; NTU problems.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
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