A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure
AbstractIn this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 16 Nov 2005
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coalition structure bargaining values;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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