The museum pass game and its value
AbstractWe discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums)team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the subscription income among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered,the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 43 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- GINSBURGH, Victor & ZANG, Israël, 2002. "The museum pass game and its value," CORE Discussion Papers 2002041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Victor Ginsburgh & ISRAEL Zang, 2003. "The museum pass game and its value," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/1683, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, .
"The Economics of Museums,"
IEW - Working Papers
149, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Victor Ginsburgh & Israel Zang, 2007.
"Bundling by Competitors and the Sharing of Profits,"
AccessEcon, vol. 12(16), pages 1-9.
- Victor Ginsburgh & ISRAEL Zang, 2007. "Bundling by competitors and the sharing of profits," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7280, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- GINSBURGH, Victor & ZANG, Israel, 2005. "Bundling by competitors and the sharing of profits," CORE Discussion Papers 2005007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Béal, Sylvain & Solal, Philippe, 2009. "Allocation rules for museum pass programs," MPRA Paper 20103, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2004. ""The Museum Pass Game and its Value" Revisited," Discussion Paper 2004-7, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.