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Stochastic Bankruptcy Games

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Author Info

  • Helga Habis

    ()
    (Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Department of Microeconomics, Corvinus University of Budapest)

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht)

Abstract

We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1205.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1205

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Keywords: transferable utility games; uncertainty; weak sequential core; bankruptcy games;

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References

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  1. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-121815, Tilburg University.
  2. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  3. Zsolt Darvas, 2011. "A Tale of Three Countries: Recovery after Banking Crises," Working Papers, Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest 1106, Department of Mathematical Economics and Economic Analysis, Corvinus University of Budapest.
  4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  5. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  6. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
  7. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1120, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  8. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
  9. Granot, D, et al, 1996. "The Kernel/Nucleolus of a Standard Tree Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 219-44.
  10. Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005. "Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
  11. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan 002, Nir Dagan.
  12. Judit Karsai, 2012. "Development of the Hungarian Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry over the Past Two Decades," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1201, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  13. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Habis, Helga, 2012. "Sztochasztikus csődjátékok - avagy hogyan osszunk szét egy bizonytalan méretű tortát?
    [Stochastic bankruptcy games. How can a cake of uncertain dimensions be divided?]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1299-1310.
  2. Groote Schaarsberg, M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M., 2013. "On Solving Liability Problems," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2013-033, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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