Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems
AbstractThe idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/182646.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Fallida; Jocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia;
Other versions of this item:
- Peris, Josep E. & Jiménez-Gómez, José M., 2012. "Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems," QM&ET Working Papers 12-8, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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