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Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability

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  • Boonen, Tim J.

Abstract

This paper studies optimal insurance in partial equilibrium in case the insurer is protected by limited liability, and the multivariate insured risk is exchangeable. We focus on the optimal allocation of remaining assets in default. We show existence of an equilibrium in the market. In such an equilibrium, we get perfect pooling of the risk in the market, but a protection fund is needed to charge levies to policyholders with low realized losses. If policyholders cannot be forced ex post to pay a levy, we show that the constrained equal loss rule is used in equilibrium. This rule gained particular interest in the literature on bankruptcy problems. Moreover, in the absence of a regulator, the insurer will always invest all its assets in the risky technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Boonen, Tim J., 2019. "Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 38-45.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:85:y:2019:i:c:p:38-45
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.09.001
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    Cited by:

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    3. Reichel, Lukas & Schmeiser, Hato & Schreiber, Florian, 2022. "On the optimal management of counterparty risk in reinsurance contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 374-394.
    4. Deb Narayan Barik & Siddhartha P. Chakrabarty, 2022. "Does Limited Liability Reduce Leveraged Risk?: The Case of Loan Portfolio Management," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-15, November.
    5. Schumacher, Johannes M., 2021. "Ex-ante estate division under strong Pareto efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 10-24.
    6. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Geng Liu & Yuan‐ji Huang, 2020. "Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1327-1337, October.

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