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Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

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  • Peris, Josep E.

    ()
    (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

  • Jiménez-Gómez, José M.

    ()
    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department d'Economia CREIP and GRODE,)

Abstract

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and political terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteristics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Constrained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules).

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Paper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 12-8.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 23 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_008

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Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards; Constrained Equal Losses; Lower bounds; Bankruptcy problems; Solidarity;

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  1. Roland Luttens, 2010. "Minimal rights based solidarity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 47-64, January.
  2. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier.
  3. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  4. José M. Jiménez Gómez & María del Carmen Marco, 2008. "A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Compensation and responsibility," Working Papers halshs-00121367, HAL.
  6. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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