Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems
AbstractThe idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and political terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteristics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Constrained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 12-8.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 23 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Campus San Vicente del Raspeig, Apdo. Correos 99 E-03080 Alicante
Phone: +34 965 90 36 70
Fax: +34 965 90 97 89
Web page: http://dmcte.ua.es/
More information through EDIRC
Constrained Equal Awards; Constrained Equal Losses; Lower bounds; Bankruptcy problems; Solidarity;
Other versions of this item:
- Jiménez Gómez, José Manuel & Peris, Josep E., 2012. "Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems," Working Papers 2072/182646, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moulin, Herve, 2001.
"Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing,"
2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Roland Luttens, 2010. "Minimal rights based solidarity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 47-64, January.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Jiménez Gómez, José Manuel & Marco Gil, M. Carmen, 2012.
"A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems,"
2072/182719, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- José M. Jiménez Gómez & María del Carmen Marco, 2008. "A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
- Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006. "Compensation and responsibility," Working Papers halshs-00121367, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Carmona).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.