Marc Fleurbaey (Département d'Economie, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cédex, France) Walter Bossert (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada)
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In a model where individual incomes depend on the agents' characteristics, we provide characterizations of several redistribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed to eliminate the effects of characteristics that are to be considered "irrelevant", while preserving the influence of "relevant" characteristics on individual incomes. The mechanisms discussed here are egalitarian-equivalent and conditionally egalitarian mechanisms, as well as averaging versions of these rules.
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Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004.
"Rewarding effort,"
Memorandum
15/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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