Sharing the Cost of Global Warming
Due to meteorological factors, the distribution of the environmental damage due to climate change bears no relationship to that of global emissions. We argue in favor of offsetting this discrepancy, and propose a “global insurance scheme” to be financed according to countries’ responsibility for climate change. Because GHG decay very slowly, we argue that the actual burden of global warming should be shared on the basis of cumulated emissions, rather than sharing the expected costs of actual emissions as in a Pigovian taxation scheme. We characterize new versions of two well-known cost-sharing schemes by adapting the responsibility theory of Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) to a context with externalities.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7|
Phone: (514) 340-6463
Fax: (514) 340-6469
Web page: http://www.hec.ca/iea/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-22, June.
- Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004.
"Local autonomy and interregional equality,"
24/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert, 1996. "Redistribution and compensation (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(3), pages 343-355.
- Nicholas Stern, 2008. "The Economics of Climate Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 1-37, May.
- Leroux, Jistin, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies," Working Papers 2004-07, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Bossert, W., 1993.
"Redistribution Mechanisms Based on Individual Characteristics,"
9307, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
- Bossert, Walter, 1995. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Bossert W., 1996. "Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 51-51, February.
- Norman Henderson & Ian Bateman, 1995. "Empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 413-423, June.
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equality and responsibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 683-689, April.
- Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 335-340, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iea:carech:1004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Power)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.