Curbing emissions through (efficient) carbon liabilities: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective
We propose a new climate policy that is efficient, robust, and asks for payments proportional to realized climate damage. In each period, countries are made liable for their share of the responsibility in the current damage. Efficiency follows from countries' anticipations of climate change, hence of future payments. Robustness is achieved thanks to the introduction of a market for carbon liabilities. Rather than being based on the expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with a carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on observed realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of countries.
|Date of creation:||May 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Etienne BILLETTE de VILLEMEUR & Justin Leroux, 2010.
"Sharing the Cost of Global Warming,"
Cahiers de recherche
10-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Étienne Billette de Villemeur & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," Cahiers de recherche 1030, CIRPEE.
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-32, CIRANO.
- Leroux, Justin & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," IDEI Working Papers 629, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Feb 2011.
- Leroux, Justin & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2010. "Sharing the Cost of Global Warming," TSE Working Papers 10-186, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Steven Shavell, 2011. "Corrective Taxation versus Liability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 273-76, May.
- Hammond, Peter J, 1981. "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(191), pages 235-50, August.
- Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46953. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.