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Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies

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Abstract

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2 times n (n >= 2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:954
    Note: CFP 793.
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d09/d0954.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
    2. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May.
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Sharing," Working Papers 1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0603, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    4. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    5. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 305-331, April.
    6. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
    7. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2005. "Strategy-proof risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-254, February.
    8. Pablo Amorós, 2002. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 57-67.
    9. William Thomson, 2007. "Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 501-521, June.
    10. Bevia, Carmen & Corchon, Luis, 1995. "On the Generic Impossibility of Truthful Behavior: A Simple Approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 365-371, July.
    11. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 04-03, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    12. Sprumont, Yves, 1995. "A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 45-50, July.
    13. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    14. Sasaki, Hiroo, 2003. "Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with Many Commodities," Working Papers 2003-01, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    15. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2007. "Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 307-325, August.
    16. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 1995. "Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 745, UCLA Department of Economics.

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