In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2 times n (n >= 2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.
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Length: 11 pages Date of creation: Sep 1990 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare (1991), 8: 247-254 Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:954
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Hideki Mizukami & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takuma Wakayama, 2003.
"Strategy-proof Sharing,"
Discussion papers
03017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003.
"Strategy-Proof Sharing,"
Working Papers
1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
William Thomson, 2004.
"Divide-and-Permute,"
RCER Working Papers
510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
[Downloadable!]
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