Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability
AbstractWe explore the relationships between non-bossiness and Nash implementability. We provide a new domain-richness condition, weak monotonic closedness, and prove that on weakly monotonically closed domains, non-bossiness together with individual monotonicity is equivalent to monotonicity, a necessary condition for Nash implementation. The result shows an impossibility of Nash implementation in all economies except pure public goods economies, in the sense that it indicates that in all economies except pure public goods economies, it is impossible to implement bossy social choice functions in Nash equilibria, which embody the characteristics inherent in those economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 05-33.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Non-Bossiness; Individual Monotonicity; Monotonicity; Weak Monotonic Closedness.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-09 (All new papers)
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