Dominant Strategies Implementation when Compensations are Allowed:a Characterization Fundación
AbstractDominant strategies truthful implementation of flexible social objectives involves the ability of the planner to alter the individual incentives in such a way that the externality imposed on society by each agent reporting a given type is fully internalized in the agent’s final payoff. In other words, the agents’ objective function must mimic the social objectives. We find that our main result is robust enough to explain why well-known mechanisms like Groves’s transfers work in some contexts while some other social objectives are not implementable in dominant strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2003/12.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Individual decisiveness; compensation mechanisms; dominant strategies.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-04-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2003-04-29 (Microeconomics)
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