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Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems

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Author Info
Ehlers, Lars
Peters, Hans
Storcken, Ton

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 49 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 103-116
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:1:p:103-116

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998. "Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange," Working Papers 98005, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Maus,Stefan & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2005. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Research Memoranda 009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Carla Marchese & Marcello Montefiori, 2008. "Voting the public expenditure: an experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 020, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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