Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.
Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13209
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
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"Tax Earmarking and Separate School Financing,"
Cahiers de recherche, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration Ã l'Universite de Sherbrooke
90-14, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
- Barbera, Salvador, 1977.
"The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1573-88, October.
- Salvador Barbera, 1976. "The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 193, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004.
"Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
- Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
- Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
- Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
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