Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
AbstractA one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 28 May 1996 / Accepted: 5 February 1997
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