Protecting minorities through voting rules
AbstractWith too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-04.
Date of creation: 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Renault, R. & Trannoy, A., 1999. "Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 99-04, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2001-10-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2001-10-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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