Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise
AbstractWe study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes knowledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the latter susceptivle for influence over the platforms. A special interest group provides campaign financing in exchange for influence over the platforms.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number 181.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON NEW- JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
LOBBYING ; VOTING;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Renault, R. & Trannoy, A., 1999.
"Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules,"
99-04, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.