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Protection, lobbying, and market structure

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  • Hillman, Arye L.
  • Van Long, Ngo
  • Soubeyran, Antoine

Abstract

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) under what condition is the conventional wisdom (that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection) valid? On analyse un modèle de lobbying par des entrepreneurs qui allouent leur temps entre les activités de supervision. On donne des réponses aux questions suivantes: (i) quelles sont les allocations de ressources en équilibre? Le lobbying pourrait-il renverser l'ordre de rentabilité parmi les firmes? (iii) y a-t-il une corrélation entre le degré de concentration d'une industrie et la protection qu'elle obtient du gouvernement?

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 54 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 383-409

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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:54:y:2001:i:2:p:383-409

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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References

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  1. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, 07.
  2. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
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  5. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
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  8. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
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  16. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Tavares, Samia, 2006. "Deeper Integration and Voting on the Common European External Tariff," MPRA Paper 960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Andrew Dick, 1995. "Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating (Forthcoming in Review of International Economics)," UCLA Economics Working Papers 730, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Koziashvili, Arkadi & Nitzan, Shmuel & Tobol, Yossef, 2010. "Bureaucracy Norms and Market Size," Economics Series 259, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  4. Tavares, Samia, 2006. "The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests," MPRA Paper 959, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Lasserre, Pierre & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2003. "A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 29-45, January.
  6. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "A Theory of Favoritism under International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-15, CIRANO.
  7. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2002. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-35, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  8. Samia Tavares, 2006. "The political economy of the European customs classification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 107-130, October.
  9. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
  10. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.

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