Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation

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Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation

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James W. Friedman
Jacques-Francois Thisse

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Abstract

We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time; once chosen, the locations are fixed forever, but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods. We are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices, and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue. Specifically, we restrict our attention to prices that support an outcome on the profit possibility frontier at which the ratio of firm 1's profits to those of firm 2 is positively related to the similar ratio of profits at the single-shot noncooperative equilibrium. For these profit-sharing rules the resulting location equilibrium is unique and involves the pairing of firms at the market center.

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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 631-645
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:winter:p:631-645

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L. Lambertini & D. Sasaki, 1999. "A Cost-side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability," Working Papers 355, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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- Lambertini, L. & Sasaki, D., 1999. "A Cost-Side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 710, The University of Melbourne.
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Yiquan Gu & Tobias Wenzel, 2009. "Product Variety, Price Elasticity of Demand and Fixed Cost in Spatial Models," Ruhr Economic Papers 0092, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
Luca Lambertini & Dan Sasaki, 1999. "Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 173-188, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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- Long, N.V. & Soubeyran, A. & Hillman, A., 1998. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a24, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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- BACCHIEGA, Emmanuele & MINNITI, Antonio, 2005. "Location in a vertically differentiated industry," CORE Discussion Papers 2005071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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- Head, K. & Mayer, T. & Ries, J., 2000. "Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction : Are FDI Decisions Strategic Complements?," Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications 2000.49, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Head, K. & Mayer, T. & Ries, J., 2001. "Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are FDI Decisions Strategic Complements," Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications 2001.49, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
Nisvan Erkal, 2003. "Buyer-Supplier Interaction, Asset Specificity, And Product Choice," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 885, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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- Erkal, Nisvan, 2007. "Buyer-supplier interaction, asset specificity, and product choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 988-1010, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
J. Hinloopen, 2003. "Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-104/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Verboven, F., 1995. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," Discussion Paper 49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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- Verboven, Frank, 1998. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation, and Collusive Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 371-98, May.
Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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- Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
Maija Halonen, 1995. "Reputation and Allocation of Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 289, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 1999. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," NBER Working Papers 6936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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- Fershtman, C. & Pakes, A., 1998. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," Papers 26-98, Tel Aviv.
- Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.
Sallstrom Matthews, S.E., 2007. "The Principle of Moderate Differentiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0720, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1996. "R&D Spillovers and Location Choice under Cournot Rivalry," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-30, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Van Long, N. & Soubeyran, A., 1996. "R&D Spillovers and Location Choice Under Cournot Rivalry," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96a35, Universite Aix-Marseille III.

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