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Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?

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  • Mayer, Wolfgang
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    Abstract

    Theoretical voting models predict convergence of two parties' trade policy platforms. In contrast, real-world observations reveal substantial differences in the platforms of competing parties. This paper modifies the standard probabilistic voting model in a way that allows for divergence of policy platforms. Two parties are shown to adopt different policy platforms if the impact of trade policy choices on expected election outcomes depends on the specific identity of the policy-promising party; that is, if the chance to win depends not only on what trade policy is promised but also on which party does the promising. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.

    Volume (Year): 6 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (May)
    Pages: 185-203

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:6:y:1998:i:2:p:185-203

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    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576

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    Cited by:
    1. Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
    2. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.

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