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Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Long, N.V.
Soubeyran, A.
Hillman, A.
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We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time between lobbying and monitoring? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitablity ranking among heterogenous firms?
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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
98a24.
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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a24Contact details of provider: Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE. Phone: 04.91.14.07.70 Fax: 04.91.90.02.27 Email: Web page: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/GREQAM/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES ; INDUSTRY ; Other versions of this item:
Article Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001.
"Protection, lobbying, and market structure ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Paper Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Potters, J. & Sloof, R. & Winden, F. van, 1997.
"Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements : the strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior ,"
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Other versions:
Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997.
"Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 1996.
"Lobbying for protection by heterogeneous firms ,"
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Devashish Mitra, 1999.
"Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination ,"
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Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996.
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Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986.
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Other versions: Collie, David, 1993.
"Strategic trade policy under asymmetric oligopoly ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 275-280, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Tavares, Samia, 2006.
"The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests ,"
MPRA Paper
959, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001.
"A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2001s-14, CIRANO.
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Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001.
"A Ricardian Model of the tragedy of the Commons ,"
Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM
20-01, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
[Downloadable!] Lasserre, Pierre & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2003.
"A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 29-45, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003.
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CIRANO Working Papers
2003s-15, CIRANO.
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Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003.
"Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry ,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2002.
"Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 02-35, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2007.
"Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry ,"
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade ,
Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 9-29, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Samia Tavares, 2006.
"The political economy of the European customs classification ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 107-130, October.
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