This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Long, N.V.
Soubeyran, A.
Hillman, A.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time between lobbying and monitoring? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitablity ranking among heterogenous firms?

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 98a24.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a24

Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Phone: 04.91.14.07.70
Fax: 04.91.90.02.27
Email:
Web page: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/GREQAM/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES ; INDUSTRY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kemp, Murray C., 1984. "A note of the theory of international transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 259-262. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
    Other versions:
  3. Cassing, James H., 1996. "Protectionist mutual funds," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-18, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. James W. Friedman & Jacques-Francois Thisse, 1993. "Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 631-645, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
  9. Hellwig, Martin, 1989. "Asymmetric information, financial markets, and financial institutions Where are we currently going?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 277-285, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Vousden, Neil & Campbell, Neil, 1994. "The organizational cost of protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 219-238, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Potters, J. & Sloof, R. & Winden, F. van, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements : the strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," Discussion Paper 27, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 1996. "Lobbying for protection by heterogeneous firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 19-32, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
  16. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Collie, David, 1993. "Strategic trade policy under asymmetric oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 275-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tavares, Samia, 2006. "The Common External Tariff in a Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, and National Government Interests," MPRA Paper 959, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-14, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. "A Theory of Favoritism under International Oligopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers 0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Samia Tavares, 2006. "The political economy of the European customs classification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 107-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.