Deeper Integration and Voting on the Common European External Tariff
AbstractSince the 1987 Single European Act, the European Union has deepened its integration process. In the case of the determination of the common external tariff, deeper integration implies that the tariff reflected union-wide preferences. If integration is still shallow, though, the observed tariff will reflect the preferences of a pivotal national government. How governments voted, however, was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to test the deep vs. shallow integration hypothesis in an effort to shed light on how decisions are made in the EU. Results support the deep integration hypothesis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 960.
Date of creation: 29 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Collective decisions; deeper integration; tariffs; European Union; decisive voter;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-01-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EEC-2007-01-14 (European Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-01-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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