Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule
AbstractIn the average voting rule, the outcome is some weighted average of votes. The unique average voting outcome is characterized by a median formula, which depends on voters' preferred allocations and some parameters constructed from voters' weights. A minority is said to be protected by a switch in voting rule if the outcome becomes closer to the median bliss point of the minority. Sufficient conditions for minority protection are that, either the minority's weight is sufficiently large or the majority outcome is too unfavorable to the minority. Applications to the composition of public goods and to public expenditures level are considered. We explore the combined use of average and majority voting in a two-stage procedure for determining the level and the composition of public expenditures. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "Protecting minorities through the average voting rules," IDEP Working Papers 0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
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