Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules

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Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules

Author Info

Renault, R.
Trannoy, A.

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Abstract

With too much disparity in opinions, minorities may question the legitimacy of majority voting and indermine the unity of the group through political violence or civil disobedience. Properties of an average vvoting rule are investigated here, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. Voters typically misrepresent their tastes by taking extreme stands. Conditions ensuring that average voting favors a minority more than the majority voting are derived. They are used to show that in actual applications of average voting, crucial factors are the correlation between wealth and tastes and the progressiveness of taxes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-04.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-04

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Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

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Paper
- R. Renault & A. Trannoy, 1999. "Protecting minorities through voting rules," THEMA Working Papers 99-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise," Economics Series 31, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996. "Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise," Papers 10-96, Tel Aviv.

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