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Tax Earmarking and Separate School Financing

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Author Info
Bilodeau, M.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 90-14.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:shr:wpaper:90-14

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Postal: Sherbrooke, Qu�bec, J1K 2R1
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Web page: https://qp.admnt.usherbrooke.ca/QuickPlace/gredi/Main.nsf/h_Toc/536568F95B90740A85257295005ABBC9/?OpenDocument
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Related research
Keywords: government ; taxes ; expenditures ; welfare economics;

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  1. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France. [Downloadable!]
  2. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "Protecting minorities through the average voting rules," IDEP Working Papers 0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.


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