Voting the public expenditure: an experiment
AbstractThis paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its effects upon efficiency are also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 020.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
experiment; voting rule; public good;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-05-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-17 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000.
"Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems,"
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- Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2003.
"Protecting minorities through the average voting rules,"
IDEP Working Papers
0303, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, 05.
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2004. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation for the average voting rule," IDEP Working Papers 0403, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
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