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Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment

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Author Info
Marchese, Carla ()
Montefiori, Marcello ()

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Abstract

This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its e.ects upon e.ciency are also discussed. The role of votersÂ’ information is considered. A comparison is made with the working of the median rule.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers with number 49.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:49

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2001. "Who participates in tax amnesties? Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 21, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  2. Montrucchio, Luigi & Privileggi, Fabio, 1999. "On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 5, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 1999. "Taxpayers Attitudes Toward Risk and Amnesty Participation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 6, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
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