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Efficiency wages and endogenous supervision technology

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  • Ferruccio Ponzano

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Abstract

Analyses about supervision technology are not frequent in economic literature. This paper analyses an efficiency wage model with an endogenous choice of supervision technology. Starting from Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles (1985) models’ I show a model with an endogenous and costly supervision technology to better explain the behaviour of firms and workers under asymmetric information in the labour market. In particular, I show how firms allocate costs between wages and supervision under these hypotheses and how unemployment affects this distribution.

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File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/ponzano.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 23.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:23

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Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

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  1. Guido Ortona, 1999. "A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well," POLIS Working Papers 4, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  2. Guido Ortona, 2000. "On the Xenophobia of non-discriminated Ethnic Minorities," POLIS Working Papers 15, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  3. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  4. Luigi Montrucchio & Fabio Privileggi, 2001. "On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 05-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  5. Locatelli-Biey, Marilena & Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "The Market for Sculptures: an Adjacent Year Regression Index," POLIS Working Papers 14, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  6. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 1997. "Taxpayers' Attitudes toward Risk and Amnesty Participation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(3-4), pages 394-410.
  7. Levaggi, Rosella & Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the Italian National Health System," POLIS Working Papers 10, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  8. Cassone, Alberto & Marchese, Carla, 2001. "Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta," POLIS Working Papers 17, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  9. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  10. Cassone, Alberto & Marchese, Carla, 2001. "Should the death tax die? And should it leave an inheritance?," POLIS Working Papers 22, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  11. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2001. "Who participates in tax amnesties? Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers," POLIS Working Papers 21, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
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