The objective of the paper is to formulate a hypothesis that can help explain the different patterns of environmental governance in three countries: Canada and the United States (both federal states) and Italy (a decentralized unitary state). To that effect, we will make use of what is a robust theory of the assignment of powers in federal and decentralized unitary states on the role of competition as a driving force in shaping these assignments. The differing patterns of environmental governance we wish to explain are that most environmental policies are enacted and implemented by the national government in the United States, by provincial governments in Canada, and by both national and regional governments in Italy.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H - Public Economics O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
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