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La teoria economica dell'associazionismo tra enti locali

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Author Info

  • Fraschini, Angela

    ()

  • Osculati, Franco

Abstract

La gestione associata di servizi locali riguarda tutte quelle forme di cooperazione tra enti locali che comportano una gestione unitaria di uno o piu' servizi ed e' anche uno degli strumenti principali per affrontare e cercare di risolvere il problema della polverizzazione dei piccoli comuni e della ripartizione delle competenze tra piu' livelli di governo. Infatti, la costruzione di un efficiente sistema di governo decentrato richiede la presenza di attori locali adeguati e quindi, data la prevalenza nel nostro paese di comuni di piccole dimensioni, la via della gestione unitaria dei servizi per piu' enti locali sembra essere quella da perseguire. Tra le forme associative previste dal Testo unico delle leggi sull'ordinamento degli enti locali per la gestione associata di servizi si annoverano le convenzioni, i consorzi, le unioni di comuni, l'esercizio associato di funzioni e gli accordi di programma. In questo lavoro l'analisi e' focalizzata sull'unione, che sembra essere considerata dalla maggior parte degli studiosi lo strumento piu' adeguato a rivitalizzare i comuni di minori dimensioni. Inoltre, all'interno del concetto piu' ampio di aggregazione abbiamo tenuta separata la fusione, da intendersi tra giurisdizioni dello stesso livello, e la cooperazione, che puo' essere orizzontale o verticale. Nel discutere di questi temi le questioni economiche che abbiamo considerato riguardano le economie di scala, le economie di varieta' , l'equivalenza fiscale e gli effetti di traboccamento, a cui si puo' aggiungere la problematica connessa con la semplificazione amministrativa e con i costi di adempimento che la pubblica amministrazione, nel suo complesso, impone agli operatori.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 65.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:65

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Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

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Cited by:
  1. Ramello, Giovanni, 2006. "What's in a sign? Trademark law and enconomic theory," POLIS Working Papers 67, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  2. Stefania Ottone, 2008. "Are people Samaritans or Avengers?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(10), pages 1-3.
  3. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2007. "Increasing the efficiency of the 'Studi di Settore' might backfire," POLIS Working Papers 83, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  4. Stefania Ottone & Ferrucio Ponzano & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009. "Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 292-304, October.
  5. Cugno Franco & Ottoz Elisabetta, 2006. "Static Inefficiency of Compulsory Licensing: Quantity vs. Price Competition," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200606, University of Turin.
  6. Nicita, Antonio & Ramello, Giovanni B., 2006. "Property, liability and market power: The antitrust side of copyright," POLIS Working Papers 75, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  7. Marchese, Carla, 2006. "Rewarding the consumer for curbing the evasion of commodity taxes?," POLIS Working Papers 72, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  8. Ramello, Giovanni B. & Silva, Francesco, 2006. "Appropriating signs and meaning: The elusive economics of trademark," POLIS Working Papers 70, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  9. Ortona, Guido & Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio & Scacciati, Francesco, 2006. "Labour supply in presence of taxation financing public services. An experimental approach," POLIS Working Papers 71, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  10. Bissey, Marie-Edith & Ortona, Guido, 2007. "The program for the simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it," POLIS Working Papers 82, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  11. Breton, Albert & Scott, Anthony & Fraschini, Angela, 2007. "Explaining differences in environmental governance patterns between Canada, Italy and the United States," POLIS Working Papers 87, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  12. Bia, Michela, 2007. "The Propensity Score method in public policy evaluation: a survey," POLIS Working Papers 79, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  13. Bia, Michela & Mattei, Alessandra, 2007. "Application of the Generalized Propensity Score. Evaluation of public contributions to Piedmont enterprises," POLIS Working Papers 80, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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