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Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange

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  • Cordoba, Jose M.
  • Hammond, Peter J.

Abstract

February 1998 In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's (1995) results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economies, relaxing anonymity and non-bossiness admits mechanisms which, as the economy becomes infinitely large, are asymptotically Walrasian for all except one ``balancing'' agent, while being manipulable with generically vanishing probability. Also considered are some extensions to non-Walrasian mechanisms. JEL classification: D82, D61, D5 Keywords: strategy-proofness, mechanism design, random economies, Walrasian equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 185-212

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:185-212

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. R. J. Gary-Bobo & T. Jaaidane, 1996. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," THEMA Working Papers 96-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2003. "Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies," Working Papers 1157, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Kovalenkov, Alexander, 2002. "Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 475-487, April.
  5. Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
  6. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2004. "The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 371-392, June.
  8. Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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