Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

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Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

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R. J. Gary-Bobo
T. Jaaidane

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Abstract

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 96-31.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:96-31

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Discussion Papers 1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- AURIOL, Emmanuelle & GARY-BOBO, Robert, 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memoranda 038, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "On Robust Constitution Design," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2002. "On Robust Constitution Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- AURIOL, Emmanuelle & GARY-BOBO, Robert, 2001. "On Robust Constitution Design," IDEI Working Papers 136, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Papers 159, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
MARTIMORT, David & DE DONDER, Philippe & DE VILLEMEUR, Étienne, 2003. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," IDEI Working Papers 212, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- David Martimort & Philippe De Donder & Etienne Billette de Villemeur, 2005. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(2), pages 149-180, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]

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