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Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

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  • R. J. Gary-Bobo
  • T. Jaaidane

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 96-31.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:96-31

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -902, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Cornelli, Francesca, 1996. "Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-30, October.
  3. Ledyard, John O & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1994. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 327-55, April.
  4. Green, Jerry & Kohlberg, Elon & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1976. "Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 375-394, November.
  5. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
  6. Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998. "Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 185-212, December.
  7. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
  8. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September.
  10. Jackson, Matthew O. & Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 354-376, December.
  11. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  12. Rajat Deb & Laura Razzolini & Tae Seo, 2006. "The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 205-232, December.
  13. Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  15. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007. "On Robust Constitution Design," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May.
  2. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
  4. Deb, Rajat & Ghosh, Indranil K. & Seo, Tae Kun, 2002. "Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 209-224, March.
  5. E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. David Martimort & Philippe De Donder & Etienne Billette de Villemeur, 2005. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 149-180, 04.
  7. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "A fair pivotal mechanism for nonpecuniary public goods," MPRA Paper 34525, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  9. Bierbrauer, Felix & Sahm, Marco, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 159, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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