We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individual have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets |R^l, representing preferences for the provision of l pure public goods. When specialized to the case l=1, these assumptions amount to requiring that preferences are single peaked, and for such a domain there exists a wide class of strategy-proof social choice functions. These were studied by Moulin (1980) under additional assumptions. Our first results characterize the complete class, after an appropriate extension of the single-peakedness condition. The new characterization retains the flavor of Moulin's elegant representation theorem. For the general l-dimensional case, previous results have shown that there is no efficient, strategy-proof, nondictatorial social choice function, even within the domain restrictions under consideration [Border and Jordan (1983), Zhou (1991)]. In fact, Zhou's powerful results indicates that nondictatorial strategy-proof s.c.f.'s will have a range of dimension one. This allows us to conclude with a complete characterization of all strategy-proof s.c.f.'s on |R^l, because restrictions of preferences from our admissible class to one dimensional subsets satisfy the slightly generalized notion of single-peakedness that is used in our characterization for the case l=1. We feel that a complete knowledge of the class of strategy-proof mechanisms, in this as well as in other contexts, is an important step in the analysis of the trade-offs between strategy-proofness and other performance criteria, like efficiency.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
964.
Length: Date of creation: May 1991 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:964
Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014 Phone: 847/491-3527 Fax: 847/491-2530 Email: Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fran Walker).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005.
"Secure Implementation,"
Economics Working Papers
0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004.
"Secure Implementation,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007.
"Secure implementation,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, September.
[Downloadable!]
Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993.
"Strategy-Proof Exchange,"
Discussion Papers
1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995.
"Strategy-Proof Exchange,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Salvador Barbera, 1995.
"Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules,"
Discussion Papers
1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2006.
"Single-Peaked Choice,"
Cahiers de recherche
2006-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2006.
"Single-peaked choice,"
Research Memoranda
037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2009.
"Single-peaked choice,"
Economic Theory,
Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 213-230, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)