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Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies

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  • Hideki Mizukami

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Toyama University)

  • Takuma Wakayama

    ()
    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism. Moreover, we prove that strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). This implies that, in classical pure exchange economies, dominant strategy implementability by a certain indirect mechanism is equivalent to truthful implementability in dominant strategy equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 04-03-Rev.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision: Mar 2005
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0403r

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Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Keywords: Quasi-strong-non-bossiness; Strategy-proofness; Augmented Revelation Mechanism; The Revelation Principle;

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  1. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  2. Manishi Prasad & Peter Wahlqvist & Rich Shikiar & Ya-Chen Tina Shih, 2004. "A," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 22(4), pages 225-244.
  3. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  5. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Ritz, Zvi, 1983. "Restricted domains, arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and non-manipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 155-179, April.
  8. Sjostrom, T., 1991. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Papers 491, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1982. "Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 17-47, June.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  12. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-34, January.
  13. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
  14. Jackson, Matthew O & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1996. "A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 23-38, January.
  15. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  16. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
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