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Divide-and-Permute

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Abstract

We construct "simple" games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own, and several variants of this solution. Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers. We also propose a simple game implementing the Pareto solution and games implementing the intersections of the Pareto solution with each of these solutions.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_510.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 510.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:510

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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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Keywords: Nash implementation. No-envy. Divide-and-permute.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nicolò, Antonio & Yu, Yan, 2008. "Strategic divide and choose," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 268-289, September.
  2. Takashi Hayashi & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 453-467, November.
  3. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
  4. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Marco LiCalzi & Antonio Nicolò, 2005. "Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good," Microeconomics, EconWPA 0510014, EconWPA.
  6. R?bert F. Veszteg, 2004. "Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 613.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.

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