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Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations

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  • Demange, Gabrielle

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 52 (1984)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1167-77

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:5:p:1167-77

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Cited by:
  1. Marc Fleurbaey, 2012. "Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 599-614, July.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
  4. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 296-308, March.
  5. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.
  6. Matthew Jackson & Herve Moulin, 1990. "Implementing A Public Project and Distributing Its Costs," Discussion Papers 882, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Marco LiCalzi & Antonio Nicolo, 2007. "Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good," Working Papers 152, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  8. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
  9. Olivier, BOCHET & François, MANIQUET, 2006. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006043, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  10. Antonio Nicolò & Andrés Perea y Monsuwe & Paolo Roberti, 2012. "Equal opportunity equivalence in land division," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 133-142, March.

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