Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good
AbstractThis paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 152.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Theory 40, 2009, 27-45
egalitarism; equity; fair division; implementation; no-envy.;
Other versions of this item:
- Marco LiCalzi & Antonio Nicolò, 2009. "Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 27-45, July.
- Marco LiCalzi & Antonio Nicolò, 2005. "Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good," Microeconomics 0510014, EconWPA.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-23 (All new papers)
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