Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Egalitarian Equivalence And Strategyproofness In The Queueing Problem

Contents:

Author Info

  • Youngsub Chun
  • Manipushpak Mitra
  • Suresh Mutuswami

Abstract

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist. We also show that it is impossible to find a mechanism satisfying queue efficiency, egalitarian equivalence and a stronger notion of strategyproofness called weak group strategyproofness. In addition, we show that generically there is no mechanism satisfying two normative notions, egalitarian equivalence and no-envy, together.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/repec/lec/leecon/dp13-16.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 13/16.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:13/16

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887
Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908
Email:
Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/research/discussion-papers

Related research

Keywords: Queueing problem; queue efficiency; strateyproofness; egalitarian equivalence; budget balance; feasibility; weak group strategyproofness; no-envy.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  2. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-67, November.
  3. Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2011. "Tops-only domains," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 255-282, February.
  4. Manipushpak Mitra, 2000. "Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1301, Econometric Society.
  5. Manipushpak Mitra & Arunava Sen, 2010. "Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 29-48, June.
  6. Thomson, William, 1990. "On the non existence of envy-free and egalitarian-equivalent allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 227-229, November.
  7. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  8. Moulin, Herve & Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2001. "Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2001-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  9. Demange, Gabrielle, 1984. "Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1167-77, September.
  10. Duygu Yengin, 2012. "Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 137-160, January.
  11. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
  12. Shinji Ohseto, 2005. "Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 589-606, October.
  13. Ruben Juarez, 2008. "The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-84, January.
  14. Chun, Youngsub, 2006. "A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 171-181, March.
  15. MANIQUET, François, . "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1662, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2011. "Group strategyproofness in queueing models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 242-254, May.
  17. KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.
  18. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  19. James Schummer, 1999. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 709-722.
  20. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism," School of Economics Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics 2011-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  21. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, 06.
  22. Shinji Ohseto, 2004. "Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 659-670, March.
  23. Hervé Moulin & Scott Shenker, 2001. "Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 511-533.
  24. Moulin, Herve & Cres, Moulin, 2000. "Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2000-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  25. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  26. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  27. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
  28. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 1993. "A Characterization of Egalitarian Equivalence," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 465-79, July.
  29. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
  30. Mutuswami, Suresh, 2005. "Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-88, October.
  31. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  32. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. De, Parikshit, 2013. "Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem," MPRA Paper 55127, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2014. "Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 281-289.
  3. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2013. "Reordering an existing queue," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 13/15, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:13/16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mrs. Alexandra Mazzuoccolo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.