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Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem

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Author Info
Olivier Bochet ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-007-0103-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 301-316
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:301-316

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Related research
Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium Implementability Justified sensitivity Double implementation Subgame perfect equilibrium Strong subgame perfect equilibrium

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Postlewaite, Andrew & Wettstein, David, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 603-11, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Giraud, G. & Rochon, C., 2001. "Consistent Collusion-proofness and Correlation in Exchange Economies," Papers 01-18, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
  4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Bargaining and competition revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Muhamet Yildiz, 2002. "Walrasian Bargaining," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. William Thomson, 1999. "Monotonic extensions on economic domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 13-33. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Thomson, W., 1993. ""Divide and Permute" And the Implementation of Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division," RCER Working Papers 360, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Veiga Helena & Vorsatz Marc, 2006. "Price Manipulation in an Experimental Asset Market," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Olivier, BOCHET & François, MANIQUET, 2006. "Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006043, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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