This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

exposita notes : Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Rajat Deb () (Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, USA)
Shinji Ohseto () (Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577, JAPAN)
Abstract

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9014003/90140685.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 14 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 685-689
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:14:y:1999:i:3:p:685-689

Note: Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Social choice function Strategy-proofness · Individual rationality · Non-bossiness.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.