Implementation in teams
AbstractThis paper considers a team production model in which the final output is a function of one or more observable intermediate variables that are functions of the actions of the team members. When there is only one intermediate variable, our model essentially reduces to the standard models in which only the final output is observable. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an outcome. This condition imposes restrictions on the possible deviations from the outcome that can be caused by every member of the team unilaterally. As a consequence of this characterization, when there are more than one intermediate variable, we are able to show that in a broad class of problems these intermediate variables may be sufficiently informative to allow sharing rules that implement efficient outcomes. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Num - Economic History - - - - -
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Carmen Bevia & Luis C. Corchon, 2007.
"Cooperative production and efficiency,"
Economics Working Papers
we070502, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Carmen Bevià & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Effciency," Working Papers 305, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2007. "Cooperative Production and Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 696.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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