An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method
AbstractWe offer an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2010-01.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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Cost sharing; serial method; Group Demand Monotonicity; Shapley value;
Other versions of this item:
- Yves Sprumont, 2010. "An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1711-1748, 09.
- SPRUMONT, Yves, 2010. "An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method," Cahiers de recherche 01-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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