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Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Olivier Bochet
Ton Storcken
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Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and either strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic social choice rules. Next, to comprehend the limitations the two Theorems imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Put differently, we look for the minimal restrictions that have to be imposed on the unrestricted domain to recover possibility results. It turns out that, for such domains, the conditions of inseparable pair and of inseparable set yield the only maximal domains on which there exist non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof social choice rules. Next, we characterize the maximal domains which allow for Maskin monotonic, non-dictatorial and Pareto-optimal social choice rules.
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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number
dp0901.
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Date of creation: Aug 2008Date of revision:
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Keywords: Strategy-proofness ; Maskin monotonicity ; Restricted domains ; Maximal domains ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Bochet, Olivier & Storcken, Ton, 2006.
"Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules ,"
Research Memoranda
003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!] Bochet,Olivier & Storcken,Ton, 2006.
"Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules ,"
Research Memoranda
002, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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