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Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

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  • Toyotaka Sakai

    ()

  • Takuma Wakayama

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 72 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 287-301

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:72:y:2012:i:3:p:287-301

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: Uniform rule; Strategy-proofness for same tops; Strategy-proofness; Tops-only; C72; D63; D61; C78; D71;

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References

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  1. Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
  2. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  3. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
  4. Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme, . "Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 434.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 195-210, August.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Olivier Bochet & Ton Storcken, 2008. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Diskussionsschriften dp0901, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  8. Toyotaka Sakai & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-free Rules between the Two," ISER Discussion Paper 0723, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  9. Nir Dagan, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Economic theory and game theory 003, Nir Dagan.
  10. Thomson, William, 1995. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 229-46, March.
  11. Ehlers, Lars, 2000. "Indifference and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 303-308, June.
  12. John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  13. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
  14. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
  15. Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 187-206, October.
  16. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Sidartha Gordon & Olivier Bochet & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2013-15, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.

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