Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
AbstractWe define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 853.10.
Date of creation: 28 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Social choice functions; Binary ranges; group strategy-proofness; xy-monotonicity; xy-based rules.;
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 791-808, November.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno, 2010. "Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results," Working Papers 448, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-20 (Game Theory)
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