Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

Contents:

Author Info

  • Salvador Barberà

    ()

  • Dolors Berga

    ()

  • Bernardo Moreno

    ()

Abstract

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties. Finally, we obtain the functional form of all rules satisfying our strongest version of group strategy-proofness. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0305-7
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 791-808

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:791-808

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Social choice functions; Binary ranges; Groupstrategy-proofness; xy-Monotonicity; xy-Based rules; D71;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  4. Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 239-242.
  5. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
  6. HervÊ Moulin, 1999. "Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 279-320.
  7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  8. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  10. Larsson, Bo & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 272-287, December.
  11. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Stefano Vannucci, 2013. "On two-valued nonsovereign strategy-proof voting rules," Department of Economics University of Siena 672, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  2. Peters Hans & Roy Souvik & Storcken Ton, 2010. "Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences," Research Memorandum 064, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:791-808. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.