Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered

Contents:

Author Info

  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

    (Osaka U)

  • Sjostrom, Tomas

    (Pennsylvania State U)

  • Yamato, Takehiko

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, the concept of strategy-proofness has serious drawbacks. First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and using the wrong dominant strategy may lead to the wrong outcome. second, almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, most of which produce the wrong outcome. Third, experimental evidence shows that most of the strategy-proof mechanisms do not work well. We argue that a possible solution to this dilemma is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, which we call secure implementation. We characterize environments where secure implementation is possible, and compare it with dominant strategy implementation. An interesting example of secure implementation is a Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econ.la.psu.edu/papers/jts%289-03-1%29.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 9-03-1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:peneco:9-03-1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 608 Kern Graduate Building, University Park, PA 16802-3306
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/info/working_papers.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Mori, Toru, 2001. " Can the Pivotal Mechanism Induce Truth-Telling? An Experimental Study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 331-54, September.
  2. Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 358.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
  4. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
  5. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
  6. Timothy N. Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?," Economics Working Papers 0055, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  7. Repullo, Rafael, 1985. "Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 223-29, April.
  8. James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Discussion Papers 1253, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  10. Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  11. Attiyeh, Greg & Franciosi, Robert & Isaac, R Mark, 2000. " Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(1-2), pages 95-114, January.
  12. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  13. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  14. Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak & Robert Dorsey, 2007. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 283-314, November.
  15. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  16. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiho, 2003. "Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?," Working Papers 1165, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:peneco:9-03-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.